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NOW's and Super NOW's: Implications 
For Defining and Measuring Money 
By  Bryon Higgins and Jon Faust 
The concept of money has long played a cen- 
tral  role  in  economic  theory  and  analysis. 
Moreover, empirical  measures of  money have 
increasingly been used in the implementation of 
monetary policy. Nevertheless, there has never 
been complete agreement on how best to define 
and measure money. 
The transactions approach to defining money 
and  a  correspondingly  narrow  monetary  ag- 
gregate such as M1 have been predominant in 
both economic research and policy implementa- 
tion.  This  approach  was  believed  to be  most 
useful  because  the  essential  distinguishing 
feature of money was considered to be its use as 
a medium of exchange. Although admitting in 
practice the existence of "near money" assets 
like time deposits, the logic of the transactions 
approach requires a strict  dichotomy between 
money and other assets. To the extent that such 
a dichotomy was not inherent in the properties 
of the assets themselves, laws and regulations 
have  been  used  to create differences  between 
transactions balances and other assets. 
Rapid  financial  innovation  together  with 
regulatory changes in recent years has reduced 
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the  distinctiveness  of  money  as  traditionally 
defined and measured. The nationwide intro- 
duction of  NOW accounts in  1981 and Super 
NOW accounts in  1983  has been  particularly 
important in breaking down the distinctions be- 
tween transactions deposits and other assets. 
This article provides a theoretical perspective 
for interpreting the implications of  NOW ac- 
counts and Super NOW accounts for the tradi- 
tional view of money and the conduct of mone- 
tary  policy.  First,  the currently  predominant 
"transactions"  approach  to  defining  and 
measuring money for monetary policy purposes 
is examined.  Next, the experience with  NOW 
accounts and the prospective impact of Super 
NOW accounts are discussed. Finally, a liqui- 
dity  approach  to  defining  and  measuring 
money  is  presented  as  an alternative  to the 
transactions approach. 
Transactions balances and monetary policy 
The  Federal  Reserve  currently  implements 
monetary  policy 'by  using  various  monetary 
measures as intermediate policy targets. These 
targets are used in short-run policy implementa- 
tion  because  of  a lack of  timely information 
about the ultimate goals of policy. It is believed 
that achieving the intermediate target will result 
in  achieving  policy  goals,  such  as economic 
growth,  price stability, and high employment. 
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to defining and  measuring money  for  policy 
purposes  can  be  evaluated  by  how  well  they 
meet  three  general  criteria  for  intermediate 
targets.' 
First, a reliable empirical measure of money 
must  exist  that  corresponds  closely  to  the 
method of definition chosen. Second, this em- 
pirical measure of  money must bear a predic- 
table  and  close  relationship  to the  ultimate 
goals of  policy. Such a reliable relationship is 
necessary to ensure that achieving target values 
will  result  in  the  desired  behavior  of  goal 
variables. Third, the Federal Reserve must be 
able  to achieve  the  targeted  growth  rate  of 
mpney by adjusting the instruments of  mone- 
tary  policy.  Although  the  controllability 
criterion raises many important issues, this ar- 
ticle focuses on how NOW and Super NOW ac- 
counts have affected the ability to define and 
measure  money  for  use  as  an  intermediate 
target to achieve ultimate policy objectives. 
Transactions approach to defining money 
The  transactions  approach  to defining and 
measuring money has been  predominant  both 
for empirical testing of economic theories and 
for the conduct of monetary policy. The basis 
for this predominance has been the widespread 
belief  that  the  amount  held  in  transactions 
balances is reliably related to total spending and 
thus to ultimate policy goals. 
According to the transactions approach, the 
essential distinguishing feature of money is that 
it is generally accepted as a means of payment 
for other commodities.  The utility of  money, 
therefore,  derives  from  the  reduction  in  the 
costs of exchanging commodities made possible 
by having one commodity that represents gen- 
eralized purchasing power.  Because  money is 
viewed as a "contrivance for sparing time and 
labor" in making transactions, the medium of 
exchange  criterion  corresponds  to  the  trans- 
actions approach to defining money.2 
The transactions approach to defining money 
assumes that assets performing as a medium of 
exchange are qualitatively different from other 
assets. Whereas all assets serve as a store of 
value, only a limited number are generally ac- 
cepted as a means of payment. Because of their 
unique  function  as  a  medium  of  exchange, 
these assets are deemed to be different from 
other assets not just in degree but in kind. 
The unique role of money as a medium of ex- 
change also serves as the basis for the belief that 
transactions  balances  are  reliably  related  to 
total spending and thus to the ultimate goals of 
monetary policy. This can be shown most easily 
within the framework of the quantity theory of 
money.  The quantity  theory  is  based on  the 
equation of exchange, which can be written as 
the identity MV = PT, where M is the quantity 
of money defined as the sum of all assets used 
as  media  of  exchange,  V  is  the  velocity  of 
money, P is the aggregate price level, and T is 
the  volume  of  transactions  financed  by 
monetary exchange. Under certain simplifying 
assumptions  regarding  the  predictability  of 
velocity and of the ratio of spending on goods 
and services to total transactions, the equation 
of exchange can be used to  derive a relationship 
between the growth rate of money and the rate 
of  inflation.  The  implications  for  monetary 
policy would then be clear-by controlling the 
growth  of  money,  the  monetary  authorities 
For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Anna J. 
Schwartz, "Short Term Targets of Three Foreign Central 
Banks,"  in Targets and Indicators of Monetary Policy, ed. 
by Karl Brunner (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co.,  John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy (Lon- 
1%9),  p. 39.  don: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), p. 488. 
4  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas  City could  prevent  inflation.  Thus,  a  measure  of 
money. composed of  all assets used for trans- 
- 
actions would be a very attractive intermediate 
target  because  of  its  simple  and  predictable 
relationship with goal variables. 
MI  as an empirical measure 
of transactions balances 
The  M1  measure  of  money,  which  until 
recently  included  only currency  and  demand 
deposits,  has  been  the  preeminent  monetary 
policy  target  in  recent  years.  Although  the 
Federal Reserve establishes targets for broader 
monetary aggregates and for bank credit, it has 
stressed the importance of M1 in the conduct of 
monetary  policy  except  during  brief  periods 
when it was felt that various technical distor- 
tions  caused  M1  behavior  to be  unrepresen- 
tative of  underlying monetary growth trends. 
The emphasis on the M1 monetary measure as a 
policy guide has been based on the presumption 
that  the  transactions  approach  to  defining 
money  is  most  useful for  policy  purposes.  It 
was  felt  that  M1  best  fulfilled  the  first  two 
criteria for a desirable intermediate target. 
Before the recent wave of financial innova- 
tions, M1 met the basic criteria for a useful in- 
termediate  policy  target.  Despite  minor qual- 
ifications, demand deposits and currency were 
the only  generally  acceptable  means  of  pay- 
ment. ~oreovei,  both were distinguished from 
other assets by the fact that they alone did not 
earn interest. In part, the distinctiveness of M1 
assets  has resulted from regulations.  Prohibi- 
tion  of  interest  on  demand  deposits  is  one 
regulation  that establishes  a  sharp distinction 
between money and other assets from the point 
of view of depositors. 
Although initially  intended  as a method of 
ensuring the safety and soundness of the bank- 
ing system, the prohibition of interest on de- 
mand deposits was subsequently justified as be- 
ing  necessary  to preserve  the  distinction  be- 
tween money and other assets.'  Until recently, 
demand deposits and currency were the primary 
assets  used  as a  medium  of  exchange  in  the 
United States. Since it is impractical to pay in- 
terest  on currency, prohibition of  interest on 
demand  deposits  increases  the  similarity  be- 
tween demand deposits and currency and dis- 
tinguishes both from assets that yield interest.' 
By  creating  disincentives  to holding  demand 
deposits except as necessary to finance current 
transactions, the prohibition of interest on de- 
mand deposits helped to make demand deposits 
and  currency  relatively  close  substitutes  for 
each  other  but  relatively  poor substitutes  for 
other assets, thereby strengthening the distinc- 
tiveness of M1 assets as required under the tran- 
sactions  approach to defining  and  measuring 
money. 
High  reserve  requirements  on  demand 
deposits  also  have  contributed  to  the  cor- 
respondence of  the M1  measure of money to 
the theoretical requirements of the transactions 
approach  by  distinguishing  demand  deposits 
from time  deposits.  Some proponents of  the 
transactions approach went so far as to recom- 
mend 100 percent reserve requirements on de- 
mand deposits and no reserve requirements on 
other dep~sits.~  This would have the effect of 
3 The prohibition of interest on demand deposits was part 
of the Banking Act of 1933. For a further discussion, see 
Bryon  Higgins, "Interest  Payment  on Demand Deposits: 
Historical  Evolution  and  the  Current  Controversy," 
Economic  Review. Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas ,City, 
July/August  1977,  p. 3.  For an example of the argument 
that prohibition should be maintained to distinguish money 
from other assets, see U.S. Committee on Financial Institu- 
tions  (Heller Committee), Report  to the President  of  the 
United States (Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, June 1976), pp. 20-22. 
Implicit interest paid on demand deposits attenuates this 
distinction  somewhat. See Higgins, "Interest Payment on 
Demand Deposits.. . ." 
5  Henry  Simons,  Economic  Policy  for  a  Free  Society 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 62. 
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for currency from the point of view of the com- 
mercial banks supplying money to the publk6 
Although the 100 percent  reserve requirement 
proposal  has  not  been  adopted,  reserve  re- 
quirements have  been substantially higher on 
demand  deposits  than  on  time  and  savings 
deposits. This, too, has the effect of increasing 
the  similarity  between  demand  deposits  and 
currency, while reducing the similarity between 
demand  deposits  and  other  assets,  thereby 
enhancing M1 as an empirical  counterpart to 
the transactions approach for defining money.' 
6 Moreover, 100 percent reserve requirements would effec- 
tively  preclude  paying  interest  on  demand  deposits  if 
reserves do not yield interest, thus achieving the same effect 
on the substitutability in demand between demand deposits 
and currency as the legal prohibition of interest on demand 
deposits.  One  hundred  percent  reserve requirements  also 
create a separation between the credit system and payments 
system, a separation necessary to the validity of the transac- 
tions approach. Under a fractional reserve system, a system 
with less  than 100  percent  reserve requirements,  there is 
necessarily  a  link  between  the  multiple  expansion  of 
deposits and the multiple expansion of credit. Thus, a sharp 
distinction  between  the credit  system  and  the  payments 
system can only be maintained with 100 percent reserve re- 
quirements on transactions balances. However, it must be 
noted that 100 percent reserve requirements on transactions 
deposits  is  a  necessary condition  for  separation  of  the 
payments and credit systems, but it is not sufficient by itself 
to ensure that separation. Additional requirements include 
absence of overdraft privileges on checking accounts, in- 
ability to use credit cards for payments, and relatively high 
transactions cost for transferring funds between checking 
accounts and other assets. 
7 Higher  reserve requirements on demand deposits  than 
other assets could be justified on other grounds. Initially, 
reserves were considered to be a liquid asset, allowing banks 
to withstand deposit losses. However, required reserves are 
now viewed  as the least liquid of  assets because they are 
legally  required.  Higher  reserve  requirements  could  be 
viewed as a means of controlling money. (See J. A. Cacy, 
"Reserve Requirements  and Monetary Control," Econo- 
mic Review.  Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Kansas City,  May 
1976,  p.  3  (reprinted  in  Issues  in  Monetary  Policy).) 
However, until October 1979, the Federal Reserve did not 
use a reserves approach to monetary control. Under an in- 
terest rate approach to implementing monetary policy, the 
level of reserve requirements is unimportant. Thus, reserve 
Economic  research  seemed  to confirm  the 
validity of  the transactions  approach and the 
usefulness  of  M1  as  an  intermediate  policy 
target.  Empirical  research  conducted  in  the 
1960s and early 1970s on the demand for money 
and other key relationships tended to confirm 
that M1 growth was reliably related to inflation 
and other policy objectives.'  Because it had an 
empirical  counterpart that was closely  related 
to policy  goals,  the transactions  approach to 
defining  money gained  wide acceptance both 
within  the  Federal  Reserve  and  among 
economic  researchers.  Correspondingly,  M1 
came increasingly to serve as the primary in- 
termediate target in the conduct  of  monetary 
policy. 
Financial innovation 
and the transactions approach 
A  number  of  financial  innovations  in  the 
1970s blurred  the distinction between M1 and 
other assets. Money market mutual funds with 
limited checkwriting  privileges emerged in the 
mid-1970s and began to grow very  rapidly  in 
the  latter  part  of  the  decade.  Repurchase 
agreements and overnight  Eurodollar deposits 
began to be used extensively by corporations to 
earn  interest  on  very  short-term  funds. 
Although  obviously  important,  these 
developments might be dismissed as merely F- 
panding the range of near-money assets without 
fundamentally affecting the uniqueness of de- 
mand deposits and currency as the only general- 
ly acceptable means of  payment 
However, the introduction of NOW accounts 
in New England in the early 1970s could not be 
rationalized so easily as being nonessential for 
requirements could best be viewed as a tax on the holding of 
certain deposits. A higher tax on demand deposits does help 
distinguish demand deposits from other assets. 
8 Stephen  M.  Goldfeld,  "The  Demand  for  Money 
Revisited,"  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity, 
1973:3, p. 577. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City the generally accepted method of defining and 
measuring  money.  After  all,  NOW  accounts 
were just like demand deposits in most impor- 
tant respects except that NOW accounts were 
not available to businesses and  paid  interest, 
although at a rate constrained by Regulation Q 
ceilings. Nevertheless, so long as availability of 
NOW accounts was confined to the New Eng- 
land region, the traditional M1 measure could 
reasonably be defended on a priori grounds as 
an adequate measure of  the nation's stock of 
transactions  balances.  However,  empirical 
research  suggested  to some  analysts  that  the 
formerly close relationship between the tradi- 
tional M1 measure and policy goals began-.to 
break down in the mid-1970s. This research in- 
dicated an unpredictable downward shift in the 
demand for money soon after the introduction 
of  NOW accounts in  New  England and other 
financial   innovation^.^  As  a  .result,  the 
usefulness  of  the  transactions  approach .to 
defining  money  and  M1  as  an  intermediate 
policy target began to be reexamined in light of 
changes in the relationship between traditional 
transactions balances and new financial assets. 
Provisions of the Depository Institutions Dere- 
gulation  and 'Monetary  Control Act  of  1980 
(DIDMCA)  gave  additional  impetus  to ,this 
reexamination because of their far-reaching im- 
plications  for  the  transactions  approach  to 
defining money.  .  . 
Effect of NOW  accounts on M1 
The  DIDMCA  authorized  introduction  of 
NOW  accounts  by. all depository  institutions 
beginning in 198  1 and ' stipulated  that interest 
ceilings on  all  time.and savings  deposits,  in- 
cluding NOW accounts, be phased out by 1986. 
These changes have already posed problems for 
9 Stephen M. Goldfeld, "The Case of the Missing Money," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,  1976:3, p. 683. 
the  use  of  M1  in  the  implementation  of 
monetary  policy.  For instance,  the similarity 
between NOW's and demand deposited prompt- 
ed  redefinition  of  the narrow aggregate,  MI. 
Further, the uncertainty  regarding the transi- 
tional phase during which consumers adjusted 
to NOW's  required several special measures to 
understand the behavior of  NOW's.  With the 
transitional phase concluded at the end of 1981, 
new problems arose, as NOW accounts began 
to exhibit  unexpectedly strong growth  in. the 
face of economic weakness.  , 
Transition to Nation wide NO W accounts 
.The adjustments that took  place following 
the. introduction  of  NOW  accounts  required 
several special actions by  the Federal Reserve 
Board. One was a redefinition of the monetary 
aggregates  to, include NOW  accounts  in  the 
transactions  measure,  M1.I0  Before  the 
redefinition, NOW accounts were considered to 
be passbook savings accounts for the purposes 
of the aggregates and were included only in the 
broader aggregates. 
This  change  in  the  way  assets  were' ag- 
gregated  did  not  represent  a  change  in  the 
method .' used. to  define  money.  Monetary 
policymakers still intended to focus on money 
as measured by assets that serve as niedia of ex- 
change. The redefinition merely represented an 
attempt  to  redraw  the  distinction  between 
transactions  and  nontransactions  deposits  in 
light of the new type of.account. 
Although the transactions.view of money was 
maintained  in  the  redefinition  of  MI, it was 
clear .that  the  emergence  of  NOW 'accounts 
10.~t  the time  that  M1  was  redefined, .the broader  ag- 
gregates were also revised. This revision process included 
creation of a new aggregate, L, which was intended to be a 
measure of total liquid assets in the economy.  For an ex- 
planation of  these revisions, see Thomas  Simpson, "The 
Redefined  Monetary  Aggregates,"  Federal  Reserve 
Bulletin,  Vol. 66, No. 2, February 1980, p. 97.' 
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transactions  and  nontransactions  balances. 
This is because the payment of explicit interest 
on NOW accounts lowers both the average and 
marginal cost to some people of holding funds 
in  a checkable deposit,  thereby  prompting a 
shift of  funds from  nontransactions  accounts 
into NOW  accounts." Since these new  funds 
would not have been held in a transactions ac- 
count in the absence of interest payment, they 
were considered by the Federal Reserve not to 
be "pure" transactions balances." 
Because  the  timing  and  magnitude of  the 
shift of  funds into NOW'S during 1981  were 
uncertain, the Federal Reserve took two addi- 
tional steps to aid in understanding the transi- 
tion period. One was the reporting of two nar- 
row  aggregates that  year:  MI-A,  which  in- 
cluded currency and demand deposits but ex- 
cluded  other  checkable deposits,  and  MI-B. 
which  included  currency  and  all  checkable 
deposits. Intended only as an aid in interpreting 
the events of 1981, M1-A was discontinued in 
11  The basis for this difference between the yields of NOW 
accounts and demand deposits is that NOW's  pay explicit 
interest, while demand deposits typically pay a higher rate 
of implicit interest than NOW accounts in the form of ser- 
vices provided below cost. It is difficult to measure this im- 
plicit interest  precisely, but a crude estimate  can be  ob- 
tained from Federal Reserve functional cost analysis data. 
The data used here are 1981 data for average earning banks 
-  with deposits between $50  and $2.00  million. These data in- 
dicate that for 1981 the implicit yield on personal demand 
deposits was approximately 6.9  percent,  the same as the 
before-tax rate on NOW accounts. The data also indicate 
that the average balance in NOW accounts is $4,328, more 
than four times the average balance in demand deposits. 
The typical higher fee per check written on a NOW account 
resulted in the average number of debits per month being 
14.7, approximately  two  lower  than  that  of  demand 
deposits. Thus, while the average yield across customers is 
the  same  for  NOW's  and  demand  deposits,  individuals 
choose  the  account  that  offers them  the  highest  return 
based on such considerations as desired minimum balance. 
desired number of debits, and tax bracket (since only ex- 
plicit  interest  is  taxed).  It is  important to note that the 
average yield on NOW's and demand deposits may be the 
January 1982, and MI-B became known simply 
as M1. 
The most significant special measure taken 
during this period was  the attempt to adjust 
M1-B to remove any  balances that  were  not 
purely  transactions  balances.  The  rationale 
behind the adjustment  process can  be under- 
stood by dividing the shift of funds into NOW 
accounts into two components: (1) the transfer 
of funds from demand deposits, which merely 
changed the composition of checkable deposit 
holdings; and (2)  the transfer  of  funds  from 
other  sources,  such  as  passbook  savings  ac- 
counts. Unlike the first component, the second 
component  is  a  shift  from  nontransactions 
assets to a checkable deposit, which increases 
total checkable balances and M1. Because these 
funds  had  been  held  in  nontransactions  ac- 
counts, they were judged to be nontransactions 
balances, which would artifically inflate M1-B 
as a measure of transactions balances." 
The task of determining the purpose served 
by funds in NOW accounts was completed by 
same, but the marginal yield could be quite different. While 
a dollar added to  a NOW account earns at least the explicit 
rate of interest,  a dollar added to a demand deposit may 
yield little or no implicit interest. See Stephen H. Axilrod, 
"The  Impact  of  Payment  of  Interest  on  Demand 
Deposits," Board  of  Governors of  the  Federal  Reserve 
System,  Division of  Research and Statistics,  January 31, 
1977,  p. 75 (processed). 
l2 Actually,  the  transactions  model  of  money  demand 
predicts that transactions balances would increase with a 
decrease in the cost of holding these funds. This increase in 
checkable  funds  would  be  an  increase  in  transactions 
balances in the same sense that increased demand deposit 
holdings  due to a  fall  in  market  rates are  transactions 
balances.  However,  the NOW-induced increase in check- 
able deposits  was  caused  by  a change in regulation,  not 
market conditions. Thus,  it is possible to judge the new 
funds as nontransactions funds in the sense that they were 
not  in  the  empirical  measure  of  transactions  balances 
before the regulatory change occurred. 
l3 Thomas  Simpson, "Recent  Revisions  in  the  Money 
Stock," Federal Reserve  Bulletin.  Vol.  67, No.  7, July 
1981, p. 541. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Chart 1  .) More than 75 percent of the nontrans- 
actions funds were deposited  in the first four 
months of the year. After that, the shift adjust- 
ment  increased  only  slightly,  and  the  unad- 
justed and adjusted measures moved together. 
This was taken as evidence that consumers' ad- 
justment  to NOW'S  took only  a  few  months 
and was probably complete by the end of the 
year.I6 If  the transfer of nontransactions funds 
were a once-and-for-all phenomenon, then the 
growth rates of adjusted and unadjusted MI-B 
removing from MI-B the proportion of net in-  Chart 1 
flows to NOW'S that was believed to have come  MI-B COMPARED WITH MI-B ADJUSTED 
would  be  similar  after  1981.  Based  on  t.his 
reasoning,  calculation  of  M1-B adjusted  was 
discontinued in Jariuary 1982.  .  . 
By  using adjusted M1-B in 1981, the Federal 
Reserve expected to obtain a more meaningful 
measure  of  transactions  balances  for  use  in 
monetary  policy.  The  shift  adjustment  sig- 
nificantly  altered  the  view  of  the growth  of 
money  in  1981,  lowering  the growth  rate of 
MI-B by 2.7 percentage points, from an unad- 
iusted  5:0  percent  to  a  2.3  percent  shift- 
from sources  other than demand  deposits.  In  Blll~ons 
estimating this proportion, the Federal Reserve  $460 
considered  several  types  of  information. 
Surveys  of  households  and  financial  institu- 
tions were used to divide inflows into NOW ac- 
counts  between  demand  deposits  and  other 
sources.  Cross-sectional  regression analysis of 
deposit  data  was  also  used  to ascertain  the  $440 
source of funds being transferred into NOW ac- 
counts.!' 
The data for 1981 indicate a  rapid  adjust- 
ment  to  NOW  accounts.  In  January  $16.3 
billion  was added  to NOW  accounts, and by 
December they had increased by $50.1 billion.  $420 
By September 1981, NOW accounts accounted 
for about 46 percent of all household checkable 
deposits, a proportion that had grown to about 
51 percent by June 1982.15 
Of the funds deposited in NOW accounts in 
1981, the Federal Reserve Board estimated that  $400 
gdjusted rat;.  Thus, the use af  MI-B adjusted 
in policy decisions placed a great deakof impor- 
l4 Simpson, p. -542.  tance on the accuracy of the adjustment. 
l5 Based  on  the  level  of  personal  demand  deposits  as 
estimated  in  the  Demand  Deposit  Ownership  Survey,  There have been both theoretically based and 
Federal Reserve Bulletin,  Vol. 68, NO. 9, September 1982,  empirically based criticisms of the shift adjust- 
p. A24, and the level of NOW accounts as reported in the  ment.  Critics  have  contended  that the survey 
Federal Reserve H.6, "Money Stock Measures," release.  evidence regarding sources of ,funds may have 
l6  See, for example, Paul A. Volcker, Hearings Before the 
Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, H.R.  been flawed by indicating  the immediate 
97-57,97th Cong., 2d Sess., February 10, 1982, pp. 21.41.  source of  funds placed in NOW accounts, in- 
-  - 
-  - 
11~~~l~~~ 
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$12.1 billion  was nontransactions funds. (See 
1980  1981  1 982  .  . :  , . .  , stead of the ultimate source, after all MI-B ad- 
justments  were  completed.  For  example,  a 
depositor might open a NOW account by draw- 
ing down a savings account, while waiting for 
the checks on a demand deposit to clear. Later, 
the savings deposit would be replenished with 
funds  freed  by  closing  the  demand  deposit. 
Thus,  the  immediate source  of  funds  in  the 
NOW  would  be  a  savings  deposit,  but  the 
ultimate source, after all adjustments, would be 
a demand deposit. If  surveys only discovered 
the immediate source of deposits in NOW ac- 
counts, the funds in the above example would 
have  been  mislabeled  as  nontransactions 
balances.  l7 
The behavior of  M1-B adjusted during 1981 
led to further questions about the accuracy of 
the  shift  adjustment.  These  questions  arose 
because MI-B adjusted growth in the first three 
quarters of  1981  was  much  weaker  than ex- 
pected, resulting in a growth rate of 2.3 percent 
for the year as a whole. This was well below the 
growth rate range of 3 1/2 to 6 percent selected 
by  the  Federal  Open  Market  Committee 
(FOMC). 
Several efforts  have  been  made to explain 
this phenomenon.'~ne  explanation is that too 
large a portion of  MI-B was removed by  the 
shift adjustment. Several statistics used to sum- 
marize the behavior of money are cited in sup- 
port of this view. For example, because of the 
inflows of  nontransactions  funds,  the income 
velocity  of  unadjusted  MI-B  should  have 
shown an unusual drop in 1981. The velocity of 
shift-adjusted  M1-B should  have  been  unaf- 
fected.  However, the velocity of  the adjusted 
measure grew at an unusually high 7.4 percent 
17 For  a  mire complete  explanation  of  this  and  other 
arguments regarding shift adjustment of MI-B, see John A. 
Tatom.  "Recent  Financial  Innovations:  Have  They 
~istorted  the Meaning of MI?"  Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, April 19, 1982, p. 23. 
rate in 1981, compared with 4.7 percent for the 
unadjusted aggregate and 2.3  percent that was 
predicted  by  using  a  conventional  velocity 
equation." Such evidence could indicate that 
some of the funds removed from MI-B by the 
shift adjustment were actually used for transac- 
tions  and,  therefore,  should  not  have  been 
removed.  l9 
Another explanation is that the redefinition 
of MI, which still relied on a clear distinction 
existing between transactions and nontransac- 
tions  balances,  could  not  capture  all  the 
changes  occurring  in  types  of  assets  and 
methods of  payment.  For  instance, the rapid 
growth  of  money  market  mutual  funds 
(MMMF's),  against which checks can be writ- 
ten, probably led to  a downward shift in the de- 
mand for M1 assets by allowing depositors to 
earn a higher rate of  return on some of  their 
The predicted  values of  MI-B velocity were obtained 
from dynamic simulation of a velocity equation estimated 
from the second quarter of 1959 through the second quarter 
of  1974.  The estimated  velocity equation,  which was de- 
rived from a standard money demand equation, was of the 
form: 
where 
V is nominal GNP/Ml-B, 
y is GNP in 1972 dollars, 
P is the implicit price deflator for GNP, 
r is a weighted average of seven interest rates, and 
Log( ) indicates  the natural  logarithm of  the variable  in 
parentheses. 
This  equation  and  the  velocity  of  the  monetary  ag- 
gregates are discussed more fully in Bryon Higgins and Jon 
Faust,  "Velocity  Behavior  of  the  New  Monetary  Ag- 
gregates," Economic  Review,  Federal  Reserve Bank  of 
Kansas City, September/October 1981, p. 3. (Reprinted in 
Issues  in  Monetary  Policy: II.  Federal  Reserve Bank  of 
Kansas City, March 1982.) 
l9  The behavior of other statistics that summarize money 
iue  discussed,  with  similar  results,  in  Tatom, "Recent 
Financial Innovations.. .," pp. 27-32. 
10  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City transactions  balances.  Also,  the  spread  of 
"sweep" accounts in 1981 may have countered 
some of the increase in checkable deposits ex- 
pected due to NOW accounts. These-accounts 
sweep all  funds above a prespecified minimum 
into a higher yielding asset and return the funds 
to the checkable account  only  when  it  falls 
below the minimum. Thus, growth of MMMF's 
or sweeps may have accounted for some of the 
weaknessofM1-Bin198.1;  ,  :.  -'. 
If  this  explanation  has  some  validity,  the 
view that transactions deposits can be sepiuated 
from nontransactions deposits may be suspect 
instead of the specifics of the shift adjustment. 
However,  the  limited. information  available 
about the experience in.198  1 is not adequate for 
drawing any firm conclusions about the source 
of the controversial MlLB behavior.  . . 
..: " . 
4. , 
~iver~ence.if  k0 w accounts,  . 
and demand deposits  .  . 
The NOW account component of M1 began 
causing'ffurther  ,confusion in,  November 1981. 
The .,quarterly  growth  of other  .checkable 
deposits, jumped from 21.2 percent in the third 
quarter'of  1981 to 27.6  percent'in the fourth 
quarter and 49.5  percent in the first quarter of 
1982.'  The. strength in NOW's,  which occurred 
during a period of economic weakness, is even 
more confusing,  given  the belief  that adjust- 
ment to the introduction of NOW's  was com- 
pleted by the end of 1981.  If this were so, de- 
mand deposits and NOW  accounts might be ex- 
pected  to grow  thereafter  at  roughly similar 
rates.1°  However, demand  deposits registered 
slight declines in'the fourth quarter of 1981 and 
Chart 2 
DEMAND DEPOSITS AND 
OTHER CHECKABLE DEPOSITS 
Billions 
the first quarter of  1982. (See Chart 2.)    his 
divergence  continued  .in  1982  as  other 
checkables grew over 30 percent while demand 
deposits increased about 1 percent. 
The growth of other checkable deposits fuel- 
ed greater-than-expected growth in M1 in 1982, 
and  for  this  reason  it  has  been  a  source of 
speculation. One relatively simple explanation 
is that the divergent growth of NOW'S and de- 
mand deposits merely represents a continuation 
of the transfer of funds out of demand deposits 
and  other  assets  into  NOW  accounts  in 
response to the intial offering of NOW's.  This 
20 Differences in ownership could cause some.divergence  in  explanation would imply  longer lags 
the  behavior  of demand  deposits and  NOW  accounts, 
especially over short periods. For example, NOW accounts  in  and  adjustment  than  some 
are held ~rimarilv  bv individuals while demand de~osits  are  analysts have asserted. but is not incon~i~tent 
held  prirharily b; dusinesses. However, it  is  &kely  that  with-the lags in adjustment  of money balances 
this difference accounts for all the divergence in the growth 
rate of NOW accounts and demand deposits for 1982 as a  by  demand equations'  If 
whole.  this view  is correct,  then the Federal Reserve 
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outward shift in money demand, since it is not 
related to a change in economic activity. 
Another explanation is that the rapid growth 
of NOW accounts and M1 could be accounted 
for  by  a conventional transactions  model of 
money  demand.  A  conventional  money  de- 
mand equation based on the transactions model 
and past relationships between money, income, 
and  interest  rates  can  predict  much  of  the 
behavior of M1 in 1982.''  However, this argu- 
ment does little to explain the wide divergence 
in the growth of  NOW accounts and demand 
deposits. Despite this fact, if the strong money 
growth does imply increasing transactions and 
spending,  the  Federal'  Reserve  might  be  ex- 
pected to restrain the money growth to avoid 
contributing to inflation. 
A third explanation of the behavior of NOW 
accounts  has  received  considerable  credence 
both inside and outside the Federal Reserve. It 
is  that  the  weak  and  uncertain  state  of  the 
economy has prompted  precautionary savings 
in  NOW  accounts.  This  explanation  implies 
that  NOW  accounts  are  fundamentally  dif- 
ferent from 'demand deposits and currency in 
that their explicit yield removes the incentive to 
hold only the minimum  amount necessary to 
meet transactions needs. Thus, consum'ers with 
NOW'  accounts  may  store  precautionary 
balances in a NOW that would formerly have 
been  placed  in a  higher  yielding  liquid asset. 
Further evidence of an increased desire for li- 
quidity  beginning  in  November  1981  can  be 
seen  in  the  growth  of' passbook  savings  ac- 
counts. These accounts declined significantly in 
1979, 1980, and the first 10 months of  1981. 
However, they began to increase in 'November 
1981, and in the 12 months ended  November 
1982  they grew  by  6.1  percent. This may  in- 
dicate that there has been a general shift toward 
liquidity on the part of the public. 
Chairman  Volcker  explained  the  monetary 
policy implications of this view in July 1982: 
In light of the evidence of the desire 
to hold  more  NOW  accounts and 
other  liquid  balances  for  precau- 
tionary  rather  than  transactions 
purposes  during  the  months  of 
recession,  strong  efforts to reduce 
further  the  growth  rate  of  the 
monetary aggregates appeared inap- 
propriate.  Such  an  effort  would 
have  required  more  pressure  on 
bank  reserve  positions-and  pre- 
sumably  more  pressures  on  the 
money markets and interest rates in 
the short run.12 
If  the  precautionary  savings  argument  ac- 
counts f,or some of the recent rapid growth in 
NOW. accounts,  unpredicable fluctuations  in 
the growth rate of NOW'S and M'1  may be ex- 
-petted to continue. The emergence of NOW ac- 
counts  may  have  blurred  the  distinction  be- 
tween  transactions  deposits  and, nontransac- 
tions .assets enough to severely complicate the 
use  of  .the transactions  model  of  money de- 
mand. In contrast, it may be that the puzzling 
behavior of  money can  be  accounted )for by 
particular  characteristics  of  -,the current 
economic situation.and the adjustment to the 
new asset. In either case, changes in the regula- 
tion of  NOW accounts are likely to bring the 
meaning of  M1  under further scrutiny in  the 
near"future. 
21 For instance, the velocity equation cited in  footnote 18 
tracks the decline in the velocity of M1  in 1982 as a whole 
fairly well. 
22 Paul- A.  Volcker,  "Monetary  Policy  Objectives  for 
1982," Midyear Review of the Federal Reserve Board. July 
20, 1982, p. 8. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City temporary distortion will reduce the usefulness  Monetary policy problems associated 
with Super NOW  accounts 
The introduction of Super NOW accounts on 
January  5,  1983  poses  new  problems  for 
monetary policy. The Super NOW's have no in- 
terest rate ceilings yet offer unlimited checking 
account  privileges  to  individuals  willing  to 
maintain $2,500 minimum balance in a check- 
ing account.  Moreover, the authority to offer 
Super  NOW'S  to businesses may  be  granted 
soon. As a result, interpretation of M1 growth 
will be difficult during the transition period in 
which funds are transferred  into the new  ac- 
count. More importantly, problems for defin- 
ing and measuring  money  under the transac- 
tions approach may persist and intensify as a 
result of the introduction 'of Super NOW's. 
Transitional problems 
Portfolio  adjustments  caused  by  the  in- 
troduction of Super NOW accounts will com- 
plicate monetary policy implementation at least 
through the remainder of the year. Competition 
among depository institutions to retain existing 
deposits and to attract new funds is expected to 
keep  the rate on Super  NOW  accounts  near 
market rates adjusted for the 12 percent reserve 
requirement on Super NOW's.  The near-mar- 
ket yield together with unlimited checking and 
federal insurance on Super NOW's  may cause 
individuals-and prospectively, businesses-to 
shift substantial amounts of funds out of NOW 
accounts, demand deposits,  time and savings 
deposits, money market funds, and a variety of 
other assets into Super NOW's. It is uncertainty 
regarding  the magnitude and timing  of  these 
portfolio adjustments that will make it difficult 
to interpret growth in the monetary aggregates, 
especially MI, during the transition period. 
The introduction of  Super  NOW's  in 1983, 
like the introduction of  NOW's  in 1981, will 
cause M1 growth to be unrepresentative of the 
"true"  growth of transactions balances.13  This 
of  M1 as an intermediate target for monetary 
policy.  In  deciding  how  best  to  implement 
monetary policy in this uncertain environment, 
the Federal  Reserve may  decide to rely on a 
shift-adjusted version of M1, as in 1981. As in 
1981,  however,  uncertainty  regarding  the ac- 
curacy of the shift adjustment procedure itself 
could  result  in  controversy  about  the  truest 
measure  of  growth  in  transactions  deposits. 
Thus, the Federal Reserve may prefer to deem- 
phasize M1 as a policy target for 1983 and focus 
instead  on the broader  monetary aggregates. 
These aggregates will be less severely affected 
by the introduction of  Super NOW's  because 
most of the funds transferred into the new ac- 
count will be from assets included  in the M2 
and  M3  measures  of  money.  In  addition,  a 
- broad credit aggregate may be used in policy 
implementation, as recently proposed by Chair- 
man Volcker  and advocated  by  some econo- 
mists."  Whatever  temporary  measures  are 
decided upon to deal with the problems for M1 
caused  by  the introduction of  Super  NOW's 
could in principle be abandoned after the initial 
portfolio shifts  are completed.  However,  the 
availability  of  Super  NOW's  may  pose  prob- 
lems for monetary policy that persist even after 
the initial transition period is over. 
23 Transfer of funds into Super NOW's from assets not in- 
cluded  in  M1 will  tend  to raise M1  growth  artificially. 
However,  transfer  of  funds into the new  money  market 
deposit account introduced in December 1982 from NOW 
accounts  and demand deposits  is a countervailing  factor 
tending to depress M1 growth artificially. Whether observ- 
ed M1 growth will overstate or understate growth in trans- 
actions  balances  in  1983  will  depend  on  which  effect 
predominates.  In either case,  though,  MI growth  will be 
unrepresentative of the growth in transactions balances. 
24 See Benjamin M.  Friedman, "Using a Credit Aggregate 
Target to Implement Monetary Policy in the Financial En- 
vironment of the Future," Monetary Policy Issues in  the 
1980s,  Proceedings  of  a  symposium  sponsored  by  the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Kansas City,  held  August 8-10, 
1982 at Jackson Hole, Wyoming (January 1983). 
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The  introduction  of  Super  NOW's  raises 
long-run monetary policy problems. Although 
reducing incentives  for financial  innovations 
that have in the past caused unpredictable shifts 
in money demand that  have themselves com- 
plicated monetary policy  implementation, the 
market rate of return paid on a major compo- 
nent of M1 raises questions not only about the 
appropriateness of  M1 as an empirical measure 
of  transactions  balances  but  also  about  the 
usefulness  of  the  transactions  approach  to 
defining money .'' 
The near-market yield on Super NOW's may 
make them attractive repositories for balances 
held for  precautionary or other  purposes. As 
discussed above,  the  rapid  growth of  M1 in 
1982 may have been due in part to a buildup of 
precautionary balances in NOW accounts, even 
though  the  yield  on  NOW's  was  well  below 
market rates and individuals had a substantial 
interest rate incentive to separate transactions 
balances from other balances. This interest rate 
incentive to segregate transactions balances has 
25 This points up the inevitable tradeoff from a monetary 
policy perspective with respect to paying a market-related 
rate on  checkable deposits. For example, a recent legislative 
proposal to-pay interest on required  reserves held against 
Super NOW accounts would remove the last vestige of the 
distinction  between transactions balances and other assets. 
By so doing, it would eliminate the remaining incentive to 
introduce  new  near-money  assets,  thereby  prospectively 
eliminating  uncertainty for  monetary policy arising from 
unpredictable shifts in money demand. However, by allow- 
ing the rate on Super NOW's to reflect market rates fully, 
enactment of this proposal would also eliminate the small 
incentive to minimize on transactions balances, thereby at- 
tenuating the relationship between M1 and total spending. 
Even if  this proposal is not enacted, however, financial in- 
stitutions may be able to devise methods of avoiding the 
cost  of  the  12 percent  reserve  requirements  on  Super 
NOW's.  There is  already discussion  of  linking  the new 
money market deposit account with a transactions account 
through  a  sweep  arrangement.  See  John  Morris,  "SBrL 
Thinks  It Can  Beat  Reserves  Rule," American  Banker, 
December 30, 1982. 
been substantially eliminated by  the introduc- 
tion of  Super  NOW's.  Under current circum- 
stances,  individuals-and  prospectively, 
businesses  also-may  decide  to  consolidate 
transactions  balances  with  other  funds  in  a 
relatively high-yielding Super NOW account. If 
so, the closeness of the relationship between MI 
growth and ultimate policy objectives could be 
attenuated, thereby possibly reducing the effec- 
tiveness of  M1 as an intermediate target.16 On 
the other hand, the 12 percent reserve require- 
ment on Super NOW's  may provide sufficient 
incentive for separation  of  transactions  from 
other balances that the traditional relationship 
between M1 and policy goals is not eroded. 
The  prospect that reserve requirements on 
Super NOW's  will  not by  themselves prevent 
comingling of transactions with other balances 
has  led  some  analysts  to  suggest  that  the 
Federal Reserve establish a "regulatory moat" 
around  transactions  balances.  By  imposing 
reserve requirements on all assets available for 
spending within a few days and including all of 
these  assets  in  MI, it  is  argued,  the  Federal 
Reserve could reestablish the distinctiveness of 
transactions balances and make M1 less suscep- 
tible  to  financial  innovation.  This  type  of 
regulatory moat could compensate to some ex- 
tent for removing the more traditional moat of 
ceiling interest rates on transactions deposits. 
However, a  regulatory moat  might  not  be 
adequate  in  restoring  M1  as  a  meaningful 
measure  of  transactions  balances.  Relatively 
low  reserve requirements have little effect on 
26 For example, rapid M1 growth might be due to increased 
demand for speculative balances resulting from belief that 
long-term  rates would soon increase rather than to an in- 
creased  demand  for  transactions  balances  related  to in- 
creased  spending  for goods and  services.  If  so,  Federal 
Reserve actions to restrain M1 growth would cause interest 
rates to rise, thereby ratifying the expectations of investors 
but  perhaps  reducing growth  in  spending  below the rate 
consistent with policy objectives for the economy. 
14  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City yields  and  may  not,  therefore,  provide  a 
qualitative  distinction  between  transactions 
balances  and  other  assets.  Moreover,  the 
premise of a regulatory moat-as of earlier ver- 
sions, such as 100 percent reserve requirements 
and  interest  rate  ceilings  on  transactions 
deposits-is  that  transactions  costs of  trans- 
ferring funds among assets are high enough to 
deter  active cash  management.*' One  of  the 
main lessons to be learned from the rapid finan- 
cial innovation  in  the  past  few  years  is  that 
transactions  costs  of  transferring  funds have 
been reduced substantially by the application of 
computer technology to the financial industry. 
The private sector has both the means and the 
incentive to bridge whatever regulatory moat is 
established. There will always be opportunities 
to create new  assets  that are just beyond  the' 
scope of  the  regulations applying to transac- 
tions deposits but are close substitutes for these 
deposits. The low  costs of  transferring  funds 
will encourage financial institutions to exploit 
these opportunities.  Some might argue, there- 
fore,  that a  regulatory  moat  is  not likely  to 
enable the Federal Reserve to construct an em- 
pirical monetary measure that corresponds to 
the theoretical concept of money as defined by 
the transactions approach. 
The  prospective  inability  to  construct 
monetary measures that correspond closely to 
the  transactions  approach  may  necessitate  a 
reappraisal of how best to define money. This is 
in  part because paying a  market  rate on de- 
posit used as a medium of exchange will lead 
to  substantially  greater  integration  of  the 
payments system and the credit system. For in- 
stance, there may be lines of credit attached to 
NOW  accounts. The medium of exchange func- 
tion will not be as distinctly separable from the 
store  of  value  function  as  in  the  past  and, 
therefore,  a  less  useful criterion for defining 
money. 
Liquidity approach to defining money 
Some analysts contend  that a liquidity ap- 
proach  rather  than  a  transactions  approach 
may be the most appropriate method for defin- 
ing money in the future.  According to the li- 
quidity  approach,  the  essential  feature  of 
money is that it is the most liquid of all assets. 
The degree of  liquidity is defined as the extent 
to which an asset can be sold or redeemed at an 
unknown future time at a known dollar price 
on short notice and with minimum costs." The 
liquidity approach, then, stresses the store of 
value function rather than the medium of ex- 
change function emphasized in the transactions 
approach. 
Nature of liquidity 
By  its  very  nature,  the liquidity approach 
assumes  that  money  is  not  qualitatively dif- 
ferent from other assets. Instead, liquidity is a 
property of all assets to some degree. The vary- 
ing degrees of liquidity of different assets can, 
in principle, be ranked along a continuum. At 
one end, currency is by definition perfectly li- 
quid in that it can be sold at a perfectly certain 
dollar  value  at  any  time,  without  incurring 
costs. At the other end of the spectrum, such 
assets as real estate are relatively illiquid, in 
part because selling them may take a long timt 
and involve substantial brokerage costs.29  More 
importantly,  assets such as real estate are illi- 
quid  because  their  prices  fluctuate  substan- 
27 There are several operational  problems  with imposing 
this regulatory moat. For example, all assets with a secon-  28 See  J.  R. Hicks, "Liquidity,"  ~conornic  Journal,  Vol. 
dary market could be converted to cash within one day.  It  72, NO. 288, December 1962, p. 787. 
would be difficult, as well as beyond the authority of the  29 Real estate is actually not the best example of an asset to 
Federal Reserve, to  impose reserve requirements on all such  use in contradistinction to currency. Human wealth is pro- 
assets.  bably the least liquid form of asset. 
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price at which  these assets can be sold in the 
future.  Nevertheless,  real  estate  has  some 
degree  of  liquidity  as  do all  other  forms of 
wealth. With assets ~anked  according to their li- 
quidity, it would be clear that, in this respect, 
assets used as a medium of exchange do not dif- 
fer from other assets in kind but only in degree. 
The liquidity of an asset depends on several 
factors, including the existence of an active se- 
condary  market.  However,  the  factor  most 
often stressed as determining the liquidity of a 
financial asset is its term to maturity.  A long- 
term financial asset, such as a bond, is  less li- 
quid than a short-term asset that is  similar in 
other respects, because its price fluctuates more 
with  changes  in  interest  rates.1°  As  a  result, 
long-term assets are generally considered less li- 
quid than short-term assets. 
The concept of  liquidity and the importance 
of the distinction between long-term assets and 
short-term assets were central to the monetary 
theory of  John Maynard Keynes." According 
to Keynes, the demand for money results from 
the fundamental  desire for liquidity and thus 
need  not be limited  to the need  for financing 
current   purchase^.'^  Instead,  the  transactions 
motive  for  holding  money  must  be  supple- 
mented  by  the  precautionary  and  speculative 
motives to  understand  the  total  demand  for 
money. 
The precautionary motive results from uncer- 
tainty.  It arises not  from the need  to finance 
perfectly anticipated  expenditures in  the near 
future,  as  does  the  transactions  motive,  but 
30  Thomas D. Simpson, Money, Banking,  and Economic 
Analysis  (Englewood  Cliffs,  N.J.:  Prentice-Hall,  Inc., 
1981), p. 128. 
31 See Hicks, "Liquidity.. .,"  p. 788. 
32 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employ- 
ment.  Interest,  and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
and World, Inc., 1964), p. 194. 
from the prospective need to finance an uncer- 
tain amount of expenditures at some unknown 
time.  In  addition,  Keynes  identified  a 
speculative motive for holding money. He saw 
this motive as related to the difference between 
long-term and short-term assets. Expectation of 
an increase  in  interest  rates  would  lead  in- 
dividuals to prefer  short-term assets to long- 
term assets, because a decline in the prices of 
bonds and similar assets would accompany a 
prospective rise in interest rates. Because of its 
emphasis on the distinction between short-term 
and long-term assets and on the importance of 
liquidity, Keynes' monetary theory is called the 
liquidity preference theory. 
Measuring money under the liquidity approach 
A narrow monetary aggregate such as M1 is 
in many respects inadequate to measure money 
under the liquidity approach. Indeed, none of 
the current empirical measures of  money is a 
close counterpart to the theoretical concept of 
liquidity. The broader M2 and M3 aggregates 
used in  policy implementation  include money 
market  mutual  fund  shares,  time  deposits, 
repurchase  agreements,  and  other  very  close 
substitutes  for  M1  assets  but  exclude  some 
other  liquid  assets  such  as  Treasury  bills. 
Although the Federal Reserve collects data on a 
broader liquidity measure, L, this aggregate has 
never  been  used  directly  in  the  conduct  of 
monetary policy, in part because of data limita- 
tions. 
Even  if  the  data  availability  problems 
associated with very broad aggregates could be 
overcome, however, these aggregates might not 
prove to be useful as intermediate policy targets 
due to the inadequacy of conventional methods 
for  constructing  financial  aggregates.  The 
theoretical concept of  liquidity implies grada- 
tions in  the degree of  liquidity per dollar for 
various assets. The traditional method of con- 
structing aggregates, however, is to include the 
16  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City entire dollar value held in some assets but ex- 
clude the entire amount held  in  other assets. 
This "all-or-nothing" method of constructing 
empirical measures is appropriate, provided the 
corresponding  approach  to the  definition  of 
money implies qualitative differences between 
assets,  as in  the case of  the  transactions ap- 
proach.  However, traditional. methods may be 
inappropriate , for  constructing . empirical 
monetary measures that correspond closely to 
the liquidity theory  of  money,  which  implies 
that differences among assets are a matter of 
degree rather than kind. Ideally, the method of 
constructing  empirical  measures  of  liquidity 
would reflect the assumption that there are not 
discrete breaks along the continuum of assets. 
A weighted average method for constructing 
monetary  aggregates would  most  nearly con- 
form to the liquidity approach to the definition 
of  money.  As described by  Milton  Friedman 
and Anna J. Schwartz,  the  weighted  average 
method 
consists  of  regarding  assets  as  a 
joint  product  having  different 
degrees of  'moneyness,'  and defin- 
ing  the  quantity  of  money  as  the 
weighted sum of the aggregate value 
of  all  assets,  the  weights  for  in- 
dividuals  assets varying from  zero 
unity with a weight of unity assigned 
to that asset  or  assets regarded as 
having the largest quantity of  'mo- 
neyness'  per  dollar  of  aggregate 
value.  The  procedure  we  have 
followed [that  is,  the conventional 
method] implies that all weights are 
either zero or unity." 
33 Milton  Friedman  and  Anna  J.  Schwartz,  Monetary 
Statistics of the United States (New York: National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 1970). p. 151. 
Such  a  procedure  would  be  ideal  for  con- 
structing.empirica1  counterparts to the liquidity 
approach  for defining money if  there were a 
reliable  empirical  method  for  estimating 
weights that corresponded  to the degree of li- 
quidity  of  each  asset.  Several methods  have 
been proposed, but none seems to be entirely 
sati~factory.~'  Despite  their  imperfections, 
however, one of these methods may become in- 
creasingly attractive for constructing monetary 
measures used in policy implementation if  the 
deterioration  in  the  relationship  between  M1 
and  ultimate  policy  goals  becomes  so  severe 
that  the  transactions  approach  to  defining 
money must be .abandoned altogether.  In this 
situation,  a  weighted  average  aggregate  cor- 
responding to the liquidity approach for defin- 
ing  money  may  become  the  best  available 
measure for use in policy implementation." 
Summary and conclusions 
The transactions approach to defining money 
and the correspondingly narrow M1 monetary 
measure it implies have predominated in both 
economic research and policy implementation 
34 An  example of  these methods is described in  William 
Barnett,  Paul  Spindt,  and  Edward  Offenbacher, "Em- 
pirical Properties of Divisia and Simple Sum Monetary Ag- 
gregates," Conference Paper No. 122, National Bureau of 
Economic  Research  Inc.,  August  1981.  For  a  different 
method,  see  V.  Karuppan  Chetty, "On  Measuring  the 
Nearness of  Near-Moneys," American Econom~c  Rev~ew, 
Vol. 59, No. 3, June 1969, pp. 270-81. 
35 The controllability  of  a weighted average aggregate is 
subject to question. It has been contended, however, that 
the problem is not insurmountable. See Paul A. Spindt, "A 
Multiplier  Model  for  Controlling  Divisia  Monetary  Ag- 
gregates," Federal Reserve Board of  Governors, Division 
of Research and Statistics, Special Studies Paper No. 171, 
July 1982. To avoid control problems, a weighted average 
aggregate might be more useful as an information variable 
than an intermediate policy target. For a discussion of  the 
use  of  information  variables,  see  J.  H.  Kareken,  T. 
Muench, and N. Wallace, "Optimal  Open Market Strategy: 
The Use of  Information Variables,"  American  Economic 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, March, 1973. 
Economic Review  January 1983 for  the  past  several  years.  However,  the in- 
troduction of  NOW's  and Super NOW's  has 
cast doubt on the usefulness of a transactions 
approach to defining money. Interest omtrans- 
actions deposits may lead to consolidation of 
balances held purely for transactions purposes 
with.balances held for very different purposes. 
If  so, the-close relationship between M1 and 
ultimate . policy  goals  would  be, weakened, 
thereby reducing the efficacy of using M1 as an 
intermediate target of monetary policy. 
The  liquidity approach  to defining money 
may be preferable to the transactions approach 
in the emerging financial environment. Unlike 
the  transactions  approach,  the  liquidity  ap- 
proach assumes that assets used as a media of 
exchange  are  not  qualitatively  distinct  from 
other assets. This assumption seems increasing- 
ly realistic, given the introduction  of new ac- 
counts, such as NOW'S and Super NOW's,  that 
can  be used as a  means of  payment but also 
provide interest  income.  If  the liquidity ap- 
proach to defining money becomes widely ac- 
cepted, a reappraisal of conventional methods 
for constructing empirical monetary measures 
may also be required. A.weighted average of a 
wide variety of assets rather than the traditional 
simple sum of a narrow range,of assets seems 
most likely to yield a monetary'measure'that is 
useful for monetary policy purposes. 
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